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We analyze carbon dioxide (CO
￿
￿
￿ sequestration as a strategy to manage future climate change in an
optimal economic growth framework. We approach the problem in two ways: ﬁrst, by using a simple
analytical model, and second, by using a numerical optimization model which allows us to explore the
problem in a more realistic setting. CO
￿ sequestration is not a perfect substitute for avoiding CO2 produc-
tion because CO2 leaks back to the atmosphere and hence imposes future costs. The “efﬁciency factor” of
CO2 sequestration can be expressed as the ratio of the avoided emissions to the economically equivalent
amount of sequestered CO2 emissions. A simple analytical model in terms of a net-present value criterion
suggests that short-term sequestration methods such as afforestation can be somewhat (
￿ 60 %) efﬁcient,
while long term sequestration (such as deep aquifer or deep ocean sequestration) can be very (
￿ 90%)
efﬁcient. A numerical study indicates that CO2 sequestration methods at a cost within the range of present
estimates reduce the economically optimal CO2 concentrations and climate related damages. The potential
savings associated with CO2 sequestration is equivalent in our utilitarian model to a one-time investment
of several percent of present gross world product.
11 Introduction
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are projected to change future climates and to cause non-
negligible economic damages [Munasinghe et al., 1996; Weyant et al., 1996]. Efforts to mitigate the
greenhouse gas problem have traditionally focused on avoiding the production of carbon dioxide (CO2)
by reducing fossil fuel use (typically referred to as “CO2 abatement”) [Nordhaus, 1992; Tol, 1997]. One
alternative to CO2 abatement would be to capture CO2 emissions and sequester them in carbon reservoirs
such as deep aquifers, deep oceans, or minerals [Lackner et al., 1995; Herzog and Drake, 1996; Hoffert
et al., 2002]. However, large-scale sequestration presents considerable scientiﬁc, engineering, and eco-
nomic problems. One economic problem is that CO2 sequestration is not a perfect substitute for avoiding
CO2 production. This is because sequestered CO2 may leak back into the atmosphere and impose future
climate damages. In contrast, avoiding CO2 production would not impose the legacy of CO2 leakage.
Whether or not CO2 sequestration should be considered as a viable alternative to CO2 abatement is an
open and much debated question [Kaiser, 2000]. Previous studies addressing CO2 sequestration develop
elegant analytical expressions to analyze the tradeoff between CO2 sequestration and CO2 abatement (e.g.,
Richards [1997], van Kooten et al. [1997], Herzog et al. [2003]) or analyze the optimal use of CO2 se-
questration in numerical models (e.g., Swinehart [1996], Biggs et al. [2000], Lecocq and Chomitz [2001]).
While breaking important new ground, these studies are silent on important policyquestions. For example,
the analytical models typically neglect the feedback effects caused by the availability of the CO2 seques-
tration technology on future carbon taxes. Also, most numerical models focus on afforestation (which can
only play a minor role in reducing climate change [Nilsson and Schopehauser, 1995; Adam, 2001]). Stud-







￿, deep-ocean or deep-aquifer injection) assume
negligible marginal costs [Nordhaus, 1992], neglect cost reductions as technologies mature, [Biggs et al.,
2000; Herzog et al., 2003]), or neglect CO2 leakage [Ha-Duong and Keith, 2002].
Here we expand and improve on the previous work in two respects. First, we reﬁne and apply an ana-
lytical model [Richards, 1997] by estimating the relevant model parameters and estimating the efﬁciency
factor of CO2 sequestration. Second, we expand an optimal economic growth model [Nordhaus and Yang,
1996] by adding CO2 sequestration, learning-by-doing, and technological inertia. We use the numerical
model to analyze the optimal use of CO2 sequestration methods and the effects of optimal carbon diox-
ide levels. Speciﬁcally, we ask ﬁve questions: (i) What is the tradeoff (or the ratio of marginal beneﬁts)
between CO2 sequestration and CO2 abatement? (ii) What is the optimal use and timing of sequestra-
tion? (iii) How does CO2 sequestration change the optimal tax path? (iv) How do technological inertia
and endogenous learning affect the optimal use of sequestration? and (v) What is the present value of a
technology that would provide sequestration in the future?
We propose an economic framework to measure the efﬁciency of CO2 sequestration. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate the net present value of sequestered CO2, in terms of avoided abatement costs, to meet a speciﬁc
atmospheric concentration constraint. CO2 sequestration can replace costly abatement measures in the








￿, the initial savings minus the future costs) relative to the initial savings represents the
efﬁciency factor of CO2 sequestration. The results from our analytical model suggest that afforestation is
somewhat efﬁcient (
￿ 60%), while long-term sequestration possibilities, such as deep aquifer sequestra-
tion or ocean injection, could be quite efﬁcient (
￿ 90%).
The analytical model provides an intuitive and simple method to account for future leakage of se-
questered carbon. The simplicity of the analytical model neglects, however, several potentially important
effects such as hyperbolic discounting [Weitzman, 1998] or learning-by-doing [Argote and Epple, 1990].
We address these shortcomings by analyzing a numerical optimal growth model. Our numerical analysis
suggests that the availability of a viable sequestration technology can lower carbon taxes and the optimal
atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In the model, CO2 sequestration at marginal costs within the range of
present estimates is deployed in increasing volume to sequester all the industrial CO2 emissions by the
middle of the next century. Learning-by-doing and technological inertia create an “R & D” market for
early sequestration, before it is competitive with abatement technologies. Learning-by-doing allows soci-
ety to “buy-down” the price of sequestration by employing the technology earlier. Technological inertia
requires earlier sequestration to achieve large-scale quantitative goals in the next century. The poten-
tial economic beneﬁts derived from sequestration are several percent of present-day gross world product
(GWP). The results of our analysis are sensitive to several parameters, such as the rate at which learning-
by-doing occurs, the maximum rate at which a new technology can penetrate the market, or the rate of
carbon leakage.
2 The efﬁciency factor of CO2 sequestration:
A simple analytical model
The efﬁciency factor for CO2 sequestration is a simple measure to analyze the economic tradeoff between
CO2 abatement and CO2 sequestration. In an optimal policy, different CO2 control technologies are used
such that their marginal social value (shadow price) are equalized. Thus, in a world in which sequestration
has a constant efﬁciency,
￿ , relative to that of abatement, and an optimal tax (
￿ ) is levied on all CO2
emissions (including those that are sequestered), the optimal “refund” levied for each ton CO2 sequestered





￿ . As the relative efﬁciency of sequestration approaches unity (perfect
substitute for abatement), the refund approaches full reimbursement. Conversely, in a credit regime for
sequestration, the fraction of a full credit corresponding to the fraction of the social value of abatement,
￿ ,
should be given for each ton sequestered.
Givenits importance, the ﬁrst goal of our analysis is to derivethe efﬁciency factor of CO2 sequestration
to compare sequestered carbon with avoided carbon emissions. For example, 100 tons of sequestered CO2
would offset 50 tons of avoided CO2 emissions at an efﬁciency factor of 50 %. To illustrate the structure of
3the problem, we start with a simple analytical model, similar to the one developed by Richards [1997]. We
expand on the analysis of Richards [1997] by estimating relevant parameters and by deriving an analytical
expression for the economic efﬁciency of carbon sequestration considering (i) discounting, (ii) changes
in future carbon taxes, (iii) leakage, and (iv) an energy penalty of carbon sequestration. As we illustrate
in the subsequent section, many conclusions derived from this simple model are valid in a more realistic
numerical model.
The tradeoff between CO2 abatement and CO2 sequestration is affected in our analytical model by
four factors: (i) the additional energy requirement; (ii) the CO2 leakage over time; (iii) the changes over
time in marginal abatement costs; and (iv) the discount rate. In the following section we develop simple
closed form solutions to represent these factors and derive an expression for the efﬁciency factor of CO2
sequestration. For analytical convenience, we approximate the problem by an inﬁnite horizon problem.
The ﬁrst factor accounts for the energy requirement of CO2 sequestration. The additional energy is
derived by burning more fossil fuel and thus imposes an “energy penalty”. The relative “energy penalty”
(
￿
￿ is the consequence of the energy-intensive nature of capturing, transporting, and sequestering CO2
emissions.
￿ is deﬁned as the relative increase in fossil fuel use due to CO2 capture and sequestration. The








Some fraction of the sequestered CO2 will leak back to the atmosphere. We approximate the leakage by









then a function of the decay rate (
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￿ starts at the time of sequestration.
For the analytical model, we assume an agreed upon atmospheric CO2 stabilization path. Associated
with this stabilization path is a path of allowable CO2 emissions. The marginal CO2 abatement costs over
time are then a function of the CO2 reductions over time and the available abatement technologies with
their associated marginal costs. If we think about the CO2 stabilization path as implemented by the appli-
cation of an emissions tax, this carbon tax would follow the same path as the marginal abatement costs,
in this stylized example. For the agreed upon CO2 stabilization path, any leakage has to be compensated
by increased abatement. Because CO2 abatement is costly, CO2 leakage imposes additional costs in the
future. The additional costs are approximated — in a partial equilibrium sense — by the carbon tax times
the leakage ﬂux.
We estimate future carbon taxes by ﬁtting a simple exponential function to results from an optimal
growth model. We use the RICE model [Nordhaus and Yang, 1996] to estimate carbon taxes that corre-
4spond to an optimal emissions path subject to atmospheric concentration stabilization targets. For CO2
stabilization targets between 450 ppm and 750 ppm, the constraint optimal carbon taxes are well approx-
imated for the next two centuries by exponential functions. The carbon taxes over time (
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6 is the initial carbon tax in U.S.$ per ton of C and
4 is the carbon tax growth rate. Note that
the optimal abatement costs at the margin are equal to the optimal carbon tax given the assumed perfect
markets. The carbon taxes are projected to increase over time mostly because the positive marginal pro-
ductivity of capital as well as the free service of the natural carbon sinks favor later abatement measures.




















A is the discount rate.
Deriving the efﬁciency factor of a leaky CO2 sequestration project is now an exercise of calculating the
net present value of the project and relating it to the costs of the alternative choice of carbon abatement.
Technically, the net beneﬁt of sequestered CO2 at time zero is the avoided carbon tax (
4
7
6 ), minus the































































M . (Otherwise, the costs of leakage grow faster than the
rate at which they are discounted and the present value sum of costs will exceed all beneﬁts derived from
the ton of sequestered CO































The expression in parentheses reduces the initial project beneﬁt at no leakage (the marginal abatement
costs at the time of sequestration) and can be interpreted as an “efﬁciency factor of CO2 sequestration”.






























￿ is the efﬁciency factor of sequestration calculated by the ratio of net beneﬁt from a CO2 unit
sequestered to the net beneﬁt of a CO2 unit of avoided emissions. Note that the efﬁciency factor of
5sequestration is also equal to the ratio of the marginal beneﬁts of sequestration to the marginal beneﬁts of
abatement in the adopted optimal growth framework.
This simple efﬁciency model is a stylized representation of the complex interactions between se-
questration and human welfare. However, such a framework may be preferable to alternative weighting
schemes that measure efﬁciency in terms of carbon that neglect issues such as the marginal productiv-
ity of capital or CO2 leakage beyond an arbitrarily chosen time horizon [Fearnside et al., 2000; Costa
and Wilson, 2000]. Although this analytical model gives us some insight into the economic tradeoffs
involved with CO2 sequestration, it has several shortcomings. First, the partial equilibrium assumption
implicit in the ﬁxed carbon tax path is only reasonable for very small-scale use of CO2 sequestration.
This is because large-scale CO2 sequestration would affect the carbon tax path which we assume to be
unaffected. Second, our analytical model neglects mechanisms such as hyperbolic discounting [Weitzman,
1998], backstop technologies [Manne and Richels, 1991], or technological inertia [Gr¨ ubler et al., 1999].
We shall analyze these effects in the more realistic numerical model developed below.
3 The optimal use of CO2 sequestration:
An optimal growth model
We use the Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) [Nordhaus and Yang, 1996]
as a starting point. This optimal growth model links the global climate and economic system by simple
feedbacks. The current model version (RICE-01) differs from the original RICE-96 [Nordhaus and Yang,
1996] model in two ways. First, we have updated the model parameters to be consistent with recent
work Nordhaus and Boyer [2000]. Second, we modify the model to account for carbon sequestration,
technological inertia, and learning-by-doing. In the following sections we give a brief overview of the
model structure and how we incorporate carbon sequestration, technological inertia, and learning-by-
doing.
3.1 The RICE model
The RICE model links climatic relationshipsbetween atmospheric CO2 concentration and net global radia-
tive forcing to economic relationships between consumption and investment in capital. The RICE model
aims to maximize the discounted sum of utility derived from generalized consumption over a given time
horizon.
The economic component of the RICE model is a Ramsey type model of economic optimal growth
[Ramsey, 1928]. In the Ramsey model, a social planner chooses paths of consumption (
T ) and investment
to maximize an objective function
U
W
V . In the RICE model, the objective function is the weighted sum of
the natural logarithm of per-capita consumption with the weighting factors population level (
X ), a factor
6accounting for the “pure rate of social time preference”










































































The Negishi weights are an instrument to account for regional disparities in economic development. They
equalize the marginal utility of consumption in each region for each period in order to prevent large capital
ﬂows between regions. This technique is descriptive rather than prescriptive; although the choice of utility
function implies that such capital ﬂows would greatly improvesocial welfare, without the Negishi weights
the problem of climate change would be drowned by the vastly larger problem of underdevelopment. A
detailed exposition of Negishi weights is given in Nordhaus and Yang [1996] and the references cited
therein.





















￿ represents the ﬂow of utility at time
￿ for region
a and the summa-




M to a ﬁnite time horizon
￿
 
V . The ﬁnite time horizon is required
by the numerical solution technique. It is, however, just a numerical approximation to an inﬁnite horizon
problem as used in the analytical model (equation 5). The ﬁnite time horizon is chosen such that the end
point has no signiﬁcant effect on the policy decision in the analyzed time frame.
Investment (
p ) in capital is speciﬁed in the model as the balance of output (
q ) that is not devoted to




































Investment contributes to the capital stock (
















































At each point in time, the capital stock and labor supply (which is exogenously speciﬁed) inﬂuence gross



























































In the model, gross world output depends on exogenously and endogenously evolving elements. The
exogenous elements are the multi-factor productivity (
z ), the population level, and the constant share
of capital (
|




￿ , which accounts for the costs from investing in carbon mitigation technologies and climate-related
damages, as discussed below.
The economic and the natural systems are linked in the model by the anthropogenic CO2 emissions
7(
} ). The CO2 emissions depend on the economic output, the exogenously determined energy-intensity
of GWP (
~
￿ , the CO2 abatement rate (

































































Without carbon mitigation the carbon emissions follow a baseline “business as usual” (BAU) scenario.












































































































































































































































￿ are the entries in the carbon cycle model transition matrix [Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000].
Atmospheric CO2 levels above the preindustrial level of 590 Gigatons of carbon cause a net radiative













































where the factor of 4.1 is the change in radiative forcing due to a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations. Note that physical variables, such as the atmospheric CO2 stock or temperature, are all global
in the model. As such, temperature change in the model is really the temporal and spatial average of the


























































































ƒ denotes the thermal capacity of the oceanic mixed layer and
￿
¡ is the climate feedback
parameter. The climate sensitivity (
￿
￿
V ) of the model is deﬁned as the equilibrium temperature response to



























radiative forcing caused by a doubling of CO2. The parameter
~
￿ represents the ratio of the heat capacity
8of the deep ocean to transfer rate from the oceanic mixed layer to the deep ocean.
￿
†
V is the deviation of




















































To complete the circle linking climate to the economy, temperature changes (
￿ , equation 18) cause eco-
nomic damages (











































The costs of carbon management and the climate damages are subtracted from the gross world product,






































3.2 Representation of CO2 Sequestration
We add sequestration as an additional carbon management option to the standard abatement option con-
sidered in the original RICE-01 model. The carbon sequestration ﬂux (








￿ from which it leaks back into the atmosphere











































All sequestered carbon is presumed in this exercise to enter the same reservoir; this is mathematically
equivalent to an arbitrary number of reservoirs for our assumption of a linear rate of decay. The original























































































Sequestration is represented as a carbon backstop technology, similar to the representation of non-







￿, Ward [1979], Manne et al. [1995]). A backstop
technology implies that the marginal costs of sequestering CO2 can be approximated as independent of
the sequestered quantity. This somewhat crude approximation might be justiﬁed because the capacity of
carbon sequestration methods (such as injection into deep aquifers, the deep oceans, or CO2 absorption
out of the atmosphere) exceeds the necessary CO2 emission reductions [Elliot et al., 2001; Herzog et al.,
2001; Ha-Duong and Keith, 2002]. Note that the CO2 sequestration method based on CO2 absorption out
of the air [Lackner, 2003] is a very close approximation to the type of backstop technology considered
9here, as the marginal costs are rather insensitive to the fraction of anthropogenic CO2 emissions being
sequestered.



















































































Sequestration becomes an additional choice (besides CO2 abatement and capital investment) to maximize
the objective function. We neglect the possibility that CO2 sequestration might occur out of the atmo-
sphere. As a result, sequestration ﬂuxes have to be below the industrial emissions.
Present estimates of the marginal costs of CO2 sequestration vary widely and are primarily based on
theoretical calculations. Given the considerable technological and logistical challenges of large scale CO2
sequestration, the cost estimates have to be taken with a grain of salt. Williams [2003], for example,
considers an integrated gasiﬁcation combined cycle power plant using coal. For hydrogen production, the
marginal cost of CO2 sequestration is estimated as roughly 50 U.S.$ per ton C. For electricity production,
the estimated marginal costsare around 100U.S.$ per tonC. For comparison, Chiesa andConsonni [2000]
analyze natural gas-ﬁred combined cycle power plants and estimates that carbon taxes between roughly
125 to 180 U.S.$ per ton C would render the CO2 sequestration option competitive. We adopt a marginal
cost for large scale carbon sequestration of 100 U.S.$ per ton C as our central estimate and explore the
implications of this parameter uncertainty in a sensitivity study (discussed below).
3.3 Representation of Learning-by-Doing
Technological improvements resulting from large-scale manufacture of various technologies have been
shown to decrease the costs of those technologies in a phenomenon typically referred to as “learning-
by-doing” [Argote and Epple, 1990]. Learning-by-doing is especially important for relatively new tech-
nologies such as CO2 sequestration. To represent learning-by-doing for CO2 sequestration, the cost of
sequestering one ton of carbon dioxide (














































































Note that the above equation implies that cumulative capacity is irrespective of the region in which the ca-
pacity is installed, meaning that cost-reducing technologies developed in each region are perfectly shared.
10The cost curve is characterized by an exponent (
























The progress ratio is deﬁned as the relative costs after a doubling of the installed capacity. We assume
a progress ratio of 85% to represent technologies between the research and development phase and the
commercialization phase [Gr¨ ubler et al., 1999]. As initial installed capacity, we assume 10 Gt C to
represent a relatively immature technology.
Introducing learning-by-doing can introduce local maxima into the underlying optimization problem
[Messner, 1997]. Basically, the technologies can be trapped in a local basin of attraction if the existing
mature technology is cheaper than the new (but initially more expensive) technology. The local maxima
can severelylimit the applied local search algorithm implementedin GAMS/MINOS [Brookeet al., 1998].
We test whether the solution is a local (as opposed to a global) solution by starting the model simulations
at different initial conditions for abatement and sequestrations for the base case. The fact that all model
simulations converge to basically the same result argues strongly against the existence of relevant local
maxima in the objectivefunction. The model is formulated in GAMS [Brooke et al., 1998] and is available
from the authors.
3.4 Representation of Technological Inertia
Market penetration rates of new technologies are limited by factors such as capital turnover or diffusion
of knowledge. The penetration rates of technologies such as natural gas, cars, or oil can be approximated
as an exponential increase of delivered quantity [Gr¨ ubler et al., 1999]. Thus a constant maximum al-
lowable growth rate seems an appropriate constraint to prevent the obviously unrealistic strategy of an
instantaneous scale-up of sequestration. An instantaneous scale-up would imply inﬁnite penetration rates,
inconsistent with the observations.
Historical rates of market penetration can be quite high. For example, the growth rate of the energy
supplied by gas has been around 7.5 % per year in the U.S. over the last 150 years (see Gr¨ ubler et al.
[1999]). However, because of the extensive infrastructure necessary for large-scale carbon sequestration,
it seems more appropriate to compare it to other infrastructure-intensive technologies (such as railroads),
which require more time to penetrate the market. For this reason we choose a growth constraint of 5 %
per year for carbon sequestration in our model. The increase in CO2 sequestration over time is hence



































The growth constraint for CO2 sequestration given above is region-speciﬁc. Thus, while cost reductions
11from technological advances can be shared between regions, the increases in capacity to sequester emis-
sions can not: each region must invest time and resources into the necessary infrastructure to sequester
CO2.
4 Results and Discussion
4.1 Analytical Model
We ﬁrst examine results derived from the analytical model (equation 7) to illustrate some general proper-
ties of the problem. As an instructive example, consider the efﬁciency factor of afforestation. We choose
economic parameter values which approximate the optimal policy in the RICE model, resulting in a dis-
count rate of 5 % year
’
￿




stabilization at 650 ppm). We further assume a half-life time of carbon in newly planted forests of 40
years, and an energy penalty of 10%. This yields an efﬁciency factor of 61%. For comparison, deep
aquifer sequestration (assuming a half-life time of 1000 years and an energy penalty of 15%) would have
an efﬁciency factor of more than 95%.
This simple model suggests four main conclusions. First, ahigher discount rate increasesthe efﬁciency
factor by lessening the present-value costs associated with future leakage. Second, a higher energy penalty
decreases the efﬁciency factor by an increase in overall energy production. Third, smaller reservoir half-
life times (equivalent to larger leakage rates) decrease the efﬁciency factor by allowing carbon to escape
sequestration earlier (Figure 1). And fourth, a higher carbon tax growth rate decreases the efﬁciency factor
by increasing the cost of cutting emissions to compensate for leaked CO2.
4.2 Optimal Economic Growth Model
The analytical model is useful to express the tradeoff between sequestered and abated CO2 emissions in a
closed form solution. The simplicity of the analytical model comes, however, at the price that the system
has to be extremely simpliﬁed. For example, the analytical model neglects the effects of (i) learning-
by-doing, (ii) hyperbolic discounting, (iii) technological inertia, and (iv) the availability of the carbon
backstop technology on optimal carbon taxes. We use the numerical model to analyze these effects.
The ﬁrst question we address with the numerical model is how the availability of the CO2 seques-
tration technology affects optimal carbon taxes. To isolate this effect, we use exponential discounting,
neglect the technological inertia constraints and learning-by-doing. CO2 sequestration is available at a
constant marginal cost of 100 U.S.$ per ton C and a reservoir half-life time of 200 a. The optimal carbon
taxes for this simulation in the case without sequestration, with perfect sequestration and with a “leaky”
sequestration are shown in Figure 2.

















































Figure 1: Relationship between the reservoir half-life time of a sequestration project and its efﬁciency
factor (
￿ ) (equation 7 in the text) for different discount rates (
A ).
In this example, the optimal carbon tax increases in all three cases in the next 150 years and ap-
proaches the marginal costs of carbon sequestration. If carbon sequestration is not available, the carbon
tax continues to rise. If a perfect backstop technology such as non-leaking carbon sequestration without
a technological inertia constraint is available, the carbon taxes are bound by the backstop price (equal to
100 U.S.$ per ton C in this example).
Sequestration acts here as a backstop technology by forcing the marginal cost of abatement to remain








leakage), society is indifferent between the two technologies as soon as the marginal costs of abatement







￿, at the intersection of the abatement costs curve with the ﬂat sequestration
cost curve at 100 U.S.$ per ton C shown in Figure 2). In the case where CO2 sequestration results in future
CO2 leaks, it is not a perfect substitute for abatement. As a result, leaky CO2 sequestration is only used
at a higher carbon tax than the marginal cost of the technology. Since CO2 sequestration is not a perfect
substitute for abatement, it is worth less in the optimal growth framework, and the price at which carbon
sequestration is used exceeds the marginal costs of $100 per ton. In fact, the ratio of the marginal cost
of sequestration to the marginal cost of abatement when both are used represents the efﬁciency factor of
sequestration introduced before. Reassuringly, the estimated sequestration efﬁciencies agree quite well
between the analytical and the numerical model. (The values are 78 to 86% in the numerical model
compared to 84% in the analytical model using the same model parameters.) This implies that the optimal
choice between CO2 sequestration and CO2 abatement in this simpliﬁed example is well approximated by
the analytical efﬁciency factor derived in equation (7).





































Figure 2: The effect of CO
￿ sequestration (with and without CO
￿ leakage) on optimal carbon taxes. See
text for details.
We now analyze the effects of hyperbolic discounting, learning curves, and technological inertia. Our
model suggests that technological inertia, hyperbolic discounting and learning-by-doing all act to increase
the optimal use of carbon sequestration in the near future (Figure 3).
In this simulation, two phenomena are driving earlier use of sequestration. First, employing the rel-
atively new technology of CO2 sequestration, reduces the future marginal costs. This effect is more im-
portant for relatively new technologies. Second, sequestering carbon in small amounts early on allows the
scale up in time to achieve sequestration of all industrial emissions early in the next century (Figure 3).
The introduction of sequestration technologies can dramatically reduce the optimal atmospheric con-
centration of CO2, depending on the marginal cost of CO2 sequestration (Figure 4).
With a relatively expensive CO2 sequestration technology (for example 150 U.S.$ per ton C) CO
￿ se-
questration is not used and the atmospheric CO2 concentrations exceed 750 ppmV in 2250. For a CO2
sequestration cost of 100 U.S.$ per ton C (the central estimate), CO
￿ sequestration is used and the peak
of the optimal CO2 trajectory decreases to less than 550 ppmV (Figure 4). The secondary increase in CO2
concentration in the long run (Figure 4A) is due to the relatively early leakage of sequestered CO2 at the
200 year reservoir half-life time. For a 2000 year reservoir half-life time, the optimal CO2 concentrations
do not show this secondary increase (Figure 4B). Note that the optimal CO2 paths for arguably realistic as-








￿, Tol [1997] or Nordhaus and Boyer [2000]).
Cheaper climate control strategies can improvethe weighted sum of present and future welfares (equa-
tion 8) by reducing the marginal control costs. In an optimal growth framework, reduced marginal control





















































Figure 3: Optimal carbon ﬂuxes over time for the base case. The simulations assume (i) hyperbolic
discounting, (ii) a technological inertia constraint, (iii) learning-by-doing, (iv) an initial CO2 sequestration
cost of 100 U.S.$ per ton C, and (v) a reservoir half-life time of 200 years. The emissions in the upper
panel include the CO2 emissions due to land-use changes (equation 12). See text for details.
costs result in reduced global warming (Figure 5a) and, in turn, in reduced climatic damages.
CO2 sequestration can hence be a valuable technology. We use the optimal growth framework to
estimate the economic value of the sequestration option as a function of initial price and reservoir half-
life time (Figure 5b). The value of the CO2 sequestration technology is estimated by the amount a social
planner would be willing to pay today for a sequestration technology. The value of a CO2 sequestration
technology is high when sequestration is relatively cheap, nearly 6 % of present-day GWP at $50 U.S.$
per ton C and a reservoir half life time of 200 years. In other words, a budget of 6 % of present GWP (as
a one time investment) to successfully develop a CO2 sequestration technology at a marginal cost of $ 50
U.S.$ per ton C and a reservoir half life time of 200 years would pass a cost-beneﬁt test in our model. The
value of CO2 sequestration technologies increases with cheaper options and with longer reservoir half life
times.










































































Figure 4: Optimal CO
￿ trajectories as a function of initial CO
￿ sequestration costs and reservoir half-life
time. The upper panel (A) assumes a reservoir half-life time of 200 years. The lower panel (B) assumes a
half-life time of 2000 years.
The beneﬁts of CO2 sequestration would justify a subsidy for this technology in the optimal economic
growthmodel. ThisisillustratedinthemarginalCO2 abatementcostsforCO2 sequestrationandabatement
along an optimal path (Figure 6).
In this example, CO2 sequestration is used even if it is (initially) more expensive than CO2 abatement.
The use of the more expensiveCO2 sequestration option is justiﬁed because the learning-by-doing reduces
the unit costs for the relatively new technology. In this example, it is optimal to subsidize early CO2
sequestration.
In Figure 6, sequestration is used early on, even though it is initially more expensive than abatement.
Such use drives down the cost of future CO2 sequestration while capacity ramps up by the maximum rate
at which new technologies can penetrate the market (equation 28). Around the year 2150, the capacity
for CO2 sequestration is large enough that essentially all industrial emissions can be sequestered. By then
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2000 years reservoir half−life
Figure 5: Effect of different initial CO2 sequestration costs on optimal temperature changes and the value
of the sequestration technology. Shown are the optimal temperature changes for half-life time of 200 years
(upper panel, A). The lower panel (B) gives the value of CO2 sequestration technologies as a function of
initial price and reservoir half-life time.
sequestration technologies have matured in the model to the point that cost reductions from increased
cumulative capacity are small, and we get the relationship that we would expect between the price of
sequestration and the price of abatement as derived in our analytical model and illustrated in Figure 2. The
ratio of these marginal costs is the marginal economic efﬁciency of sequestration relative to abatement.
Clearly, early sequestration efforts are quite valuable in this example. In the near term, the marginal
sequestration costs are above the marginal abatement costs as speciﬁed by the initial conditions in the
model. In the optimal policy, the marginal costs for the optimal use of CO2 decline due to learning-by-
doing. In the long run, the marginal costs for optimal CO2 sequestration fall below the marginal costs for
optimal CO2 abatement because leaky CO2 sequestration is inefﬁcient (due to leakage) and hence has a
lower shadow value than CO2 abatement (similar to Figure 2).








































Figure 6: Marginal costs for CO
￿ sequestration (stars) and CO
￿ abatement (circles) for an initial seques-
tration price of 100 U.S.$ per ton C.
5 Caveats
Our analysis is subject to considerable parameter uncertainty and the results are — of course — sensitive
to the chosen parameters. We explore some effects of parameter uncertainty by a simple scenario analysis.
(Note that this approachstill assumes perfect knowledgewithin each scenario). We examinethe sensitivity
of the optimal CO2 trajectories with respect to the technological inertia, the progress ratio, and the present
experience in CO2 sequestration. This sensitivity analysis suggests that the model conclusions are very
sensitivetothe constraintontechnological inertiaandtheprogressratio, butare lesssensitivetothepresent
experience in CO2 sequestration (Figure 7). It is somewhat reassuring that the alternativechoices of model
parameters shown in Figure 7 do not considerably affect the optimal trajectories of CO2 and carbon taxes
over the next few decades.
Our models as nothing more than thinking tools to analyze the interactions of the social and natural
system in a consistent way. Important limitations of our analysis include the limited treatment of uncer-
tainty and the crude approximations of the natural and economic system. Finally, it is important to recall
two of our main assumptions. (i) CO2 sequestration is both available and safe in large quantities; (ii)
Decisions are based on a discounted utilitarian framework.









































































































































































































Figure 7: Sensitivity study with respect to the representation of the progress ratio (panels A and B, param-
eter pr, as deﬁned in equation 27), the initial installed cumulative base of CO
￿ sequestration (panels C and
D, parameter cc, as deﬁned in equation 25), and the technological inertia (panels E and F, parameter
￿ , as
deﬁned in equation 28). Each sensitivity study compares the base case with a high and low value for the
parameter in question.
6 Conclusions
Our analysis suggests three main conclusions. First, the analysis of the net present value of CO
￿ sequestra-
tion yields an expression for the efﬁciency factor which seems preferable to previous carbon accounting
methods. Second, a subsidy for the initially noncompetitive technology of CO2 sequestration can be a
sound economic policy. Subsidies for CO2 sequestration can help to overcome technological inertia, to
reduce marginal costs via learning-by-doing, and to increase per capita consumption. Third, and ﬁnally,
CO2 sequestration presents a potential low-costsolutionto the greenhouse gas problem. CO2 sequestration
could reduce mitigation costs and climate damages considerably.
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